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Ar t i c l es
Hong Kong has undergone profound changes in re-cent decades. (1) In the political sphere, the formerBritish colony was handed over to China in 1997
under Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” for-
mula. In the economic sphere, ever since China’s reform
and opening of the late 1970s and more so since the han-
dover, Hong Kong has become increasingly linked to its
hinterland in the Pearl River Delta, with which it is trying
to build a megaregion of 40 million inhabitants. Hong
Kong’s claim to be a world city depends on a coalition of
actors from the government and the business lobby develop-
ing urban policies purporting to foster economic competi-
tiveness. 
However, Hong Kong’s urban planning is being trans-
formed with the emergence of civil society, (2) and of several
community-based movements challenging the policies pre-
ferred by the coalition that dominates planning forums. This
article aims to study the extent and nature of, as well as the
alternatives emerging from, this challenge, examining the
possibility of a turn towards a collaborative approach to
urban planning, incorporating alternative strategies.
In order to do so, this article will consider the reasons for
the formation of a coalition favouring the growth and then
the development of external and internal resistance to it,
seeking to formulate new alternatives. The concluding por-
tion will dwell on the significance of such evolutions with re-
gard to the paradigmatic change towards the collaborative
approach to sustainable urban planning and development in
Hong Kong politics.
The  growth coal it ion of
government and pr ivate ac tors
Incomplete  democratic  mechanisms
Hong Kong, which became a British colony in 1841, was
handed back to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, but remains set
apart from the rest of the People’s Republic. Its mini-consti-
tution, the Basic Law, governs the political setup charac-
terised by the “one country, two systems” principle. It allows
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) to
keep its judicial and political systems, its currency and immi-
gration laws intact until 2047, i.e., for 50 years after the
transfer of sovereignty.
The SAR’s ruling executive council is headed by a Chief
Executive enjoying a five-year term in office. Tung Chee-
hwa held the post between 1997 and 2005. He was re-
placed by Donald Tsang, who had headed the civil service
and had previously held senior posts in the colonial admin-
istration. The government is made up of 14 ministers answer-
ing to the Chief Executive. The Legislative Council, which
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Urban planning in Hong Kong is being transformed with the expansion of civil society and the development of various
community movements. They are posing a challenge to current urban planning practices and throwing up conditions
for a collaborative approach to urban planning, fashioning alternative strategies.
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adopts laws but has no control over the executive, is made
up of 60 members, half of them elected by popular vote in
geographical constituencies and the others chosen through
sectoral functional constituencies. (3)
Thus, while Hong Kong aspires to be a “world city” (4) like
New York or Tokyo, it differs greatly from those competitors.
It still lacks real universal suffrage, which some regard as an
obstacle to attaining global city status. There has been much
debate on this issue, and on 29 December 2007, the Chi-
nese authorities announced that the Chief Executive would
be elected through universal suffrage in 2017 and the legis-
lature in 2020.
A coal it ion between the  po lit i ca l  e l ite  and
businesses
At the outset it may be noted that Hong Kong’s territory is
characterised by its small size and the extent of natural land-
scape dominated by hills and slopes. Just 20 percent of the
territory is built up, and more than 38 percent is protected
by the Country Parks Ordinance. There are two main forms
of habitation in Hong Kong: high density areas around Vic-
toria Harbour and newly developed areas on the one hand,
and low density villages and semi-urban areas on the other.
Another distinguishing feature of Hong Kong is the mode of
ownership and management of land area. The government
owns all the land, with the exception of the plot on which St
John’s Cathedral stands, and grants leases for certain peri-
ods of time. This puts Hong Kong’s government in a crucial
situation, giving it more powers than enjoyed in Western
countries. The city often held up as highly liberal paradoxi-
cally thus reveals a rather more interventionist side. (5) The
government can easily influence the general use to which
plots of land are put by, for instance, favouring major inter-
est groups under the control of tycoons, especially when it is
fiscally opportune for the authorities.
The theory of urban regimes, (6) or that of growth coalitions, (7)
helps clarify this situation through the idea that municipal
governance is often characterised by an arrangement between
public and private actors pursuing economic growth. Citing
Atlanta, in the US state of Georgia, Clarence Stone noted
the early formation of a biracial coalition between a small
economic interest group in the central business district and
representatives of the black community. This coalition helped
maintain racial tolerance and formulate highly effective and
innovative urban policies for economic development.
Among the various approaches with regard to local authori-
ties, the urban regime theory considers them to represent a
process of social production rather than of social control.
Thus, contrary to the debates pitting pluralists against elitists
over the question “who governs?”, this theory is more con-
cerned with the means needed to put in place a capacity for
action. It is therefore about a universe in which the authori-
ties are seen as constituting an action agent rather than an
instrument of domination.
According to the urban regime approach, the actors and in-
stitutions are implicated in a complex system. In this context,
the state can find it difficult to be an agent of authority and
control, the government acting more as a resource mobiliser
and coordinator. To be effective, governments have to ally
with a number of non-governmental actors: “In responding to
social change and conflict, governmental and non-govern-
mental actors are encouraged to form regimes to facilitate ac-
tion and empower themselves.” (8) In concrete terms, a
regime is defined thus: “An informal yet relatively stable
group with access to institutional resources that enable it to
have a sustained role in making governing decisions. Partic-
ipants are likely to have an institutional base; that is, they are
likely to have a domain of command power. The regime,
however, is formed as an informal basis for coordination and
without an all encompassing structure of command.” (9)
In Asia, Singapore offers the prime example of a phenome-
non in which state interests are mixed up with those of the
ruling party and its leaders. The urban regime in place gen-
erates impressive economic growth (there is talk of “Singa-
pore, Inc.”) that facilitates many paternalistic policies, espe-
cially the major public housing programmes. Hong Kong’s
situation is quite similar, (10) with the government’s centrality
being in effect the basis for the constitution of this urban
regime. It owns all the land and has the means to act strate-
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gically in regulating the economy and society. The business
lobby, symbolised by tycoons who dominate the major prop-
erty groups and control massive resources, constitutes the
other facet of this coalition. Hong Kong’s originality lies in
the system of socio-professional constituencies that give the
business lobby a much greater weight than envisaged in
Stone’s theory: “Whereas in other countries, business lob-
bies try to buy the support of politicians, usually through large
campaign contributions, in Hong Kong, the situation is re-
versed. The government is put in the peculiar position of hav-
ing to stay in the good graces of the business lobbies, or risk
losing valuable political support.” (11) These two actors thus
have different but complementary resources and interests.
They depend on the same system based on trust rather than
authority or hierarchy. Contrary to the theoretical model
based on Western experiences, Hong Kong’s civil society,
trade unions, and other citizen groups are still largely ex-
cluded from this dynamic, due as much to the institutional
and political context as to the nature of the compromise
adopted in the urban regime. The business lobby therefore
wants to keep its dominant position. Some tycoons even have
seats on the legislature and benefit from direct access to de-
cision-making. They want to preserve that by applying breaks
on any evolution towards democratisation universal suffrage:
“Thus now we see wealthy businessmen and women in
LegCo arguing that they provide a counterweight to irrespon-
sible popular politics, that Hong Kong is not ready for
democracy, and that what is best for the economy and the
public is only coincidentally what is best for themselves.” (12)
This urban regime resembles a growth coalition and defends
a municipal development model favouring regional economic
competitiveness. These city planning choices are aimed at
projecting Hong Kong as a “world city.” (13) In fact, ever since
China adopted economic reforms in the late 1970s, Hong
Kong’s economic base has shifted from being an Asian
Tiger along with Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea.
Hong Kong has moved its industrial sector out into the Pearl
River Delta, especially to Shenzhen, where the tycoons con-
trol part of the action, and has largely replaced it with a serv-
ices sector mainly based on finance. This evolution in the
economic base implies a change in the city’s occupation
modes. The need for industrial areas often situated on the
periphery gave way to a large extent to the demand for other
types of space, mostly for offices. This evolution added to
the tradition of land reclamation around Victoria Har-
bour, (14) both on Hong Kong Island around the Central dis-
trict and on the Kowloon side, especially the area that for
many decades housed the Kai Tak Airport, the fate of
which is now the subject of much debate. This tradition of
reclamation boosts the interests of the government, which
sees in it the opportunity to carve out new high-value space
to boost its coffers. This collusion between political and eco-
nomic elites underpins Hong Kong’s planning system.
Bureaucratic  planning  in  favour  of
economic  competit iveness
In terms of public policy making, urban planning forms part of
a traditional mode of intervention. But the absence of univer-
sal suffrage reinforces the executive’s – and the administration’s
– omnipresence. This rests on a strong bureaucracy, which in
the normal course would tend to practice a rational mode of
planning. Traditional urban planning is founded on the value of
scientific knowledge and expertise, especially of associated in-
formation (statistical or cartographic). The rational model aims
to serve public interest. (15) In fact, this model is dominated by
a spatial approach with the objective of regulating land use and
urban growth through zoning and stipulating building densities,
and through ensuring infrastructure addition.
British colonial tradition and now the practices of the SAR
authorities leave little room for public consultation or partic-
ipation in decision-making. Strategies are worked out in
great secrecy and decisions are arrived at rapidly, often with-
out debate: “The legal system has legitimized a set of plan-
ning and development processes that deny citizens a right to
participate and confines decision-making power to a privi-
leged few at the apex of the power structure.” (16) The organ-
isation of Hong Kong’s government follows a traditional
model grafted onto a rational period. On the ladder of par-
ticipation, (17) ranging from manipulation to co-decision via in-
formation and partnership, Hong Kong languishes at the
lower rungs. Besides, the Transport and Housing Bureau
has more clout than the Environment Bureau, and so policy-
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making tends to favour economic development at the cost of
sustainable urban growth, even though since 2007 a “Devel-
opment Bureau” has emerged following an administrative
overhaul. After 2001, the Urban Renewal Authority
(URA) replaced the Land Development Corporation and
has generally been the official arm handling different poli-
cies towards the oldest urbanised neighbourhoods. In this re-
gard, Hong Kong’s situation once again resembles that of
Singapore, where the Urban Redevelopment Authority is at
the heart of public policies.
With globalisation rendering economic and entrepreneurial ac-
tivity more volatile, (18) the growth coalition’s favoured urban poli-
cies rest on enhancing economic attractiveness in order to pro-
mote Hong Kong’s competitive edge over other cities. In this
perspective, building strategies of cities tend to imitate each
other, (19) leading to expansion of business districts offering office
towers, conference and exhibition centres, high speed train sta-
tions, or quick connections to the international airport. Hong
Kong’s International Finance Centre (IFC) is typical of this
evolution, having enlisted star architect Cesar Pelli for its impos-
ing second tower. This marks the urban landscape to the point
of turning it into city branding. Needless to say, it focuses on su-
perior tertiary activities; the trade centre hosts top brands and
the most luxurious services, and enjoys proximity to a transport
hub with a quick hop to the airport. Meanwhile, housing has
also been transformed to offer high-class luxury to expatriates or
well-heeled locals who wish to enjoy the same benefits. 
Finally, in urban planning, two forms of rationality compete
in Hong Kong: on the one side, a coalition of political and
economic elites favouring economic competitiveness based
on a rational planning approach; and on the other an emerg-
ing civil society challenging this urban development model
and proposing instead a shift towards a community-based
and sustainable model taking a collaborative approach to
planning. These two sides confront each other in an often
explicit manner through fierce controversies such as over the
process of reclamation in Wan Chai district. 
External  chall enge  through
residents ’  mobil isation and
exper iment  with community
approaches  to  p lanning:  The
Wan Chai  example
Wan Chai  as catalyst  for l ocal  awakening
The Wan Chai Market was built in 1937 in line with con-
temporary architectural rules (often linked to the Bauhaus
style, but specialists reject this reference). The building is
steeped in history: during the wartime Japanese occupation,
it was used to store corpses. 
The market was renovated in 1961, and in the late 1990s
talk emerged of a new round of modernisation. The Execu-
Wan Chai Market in 2008 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wan_Chai_
Market_Outside_View_2008.jpg
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tive Council authorised the Land Development Corporation
to purchase several plots in Wan Chai to undertake urban re-
newal. A consortium was formed (Chinese Estates 40 per-
cent, Kwong Sang Hong 25 percent, Chi Cheung Invest-
ment 20 percent, and Peregrine Group 15 percent).
In 1996, Chinese Estates, controlled by billionaire Joseph
Lau Luen-hung, teamed up with the URA to redevelop the
site and build a luxury residential and commercial complex
in a good illustration of the collusion within the coalition of
public and private actors seeking to use policies in favour of
modernisation. The first phase included a new market that
incorporates more modern standards and luxurious space but
is also more anodyne. 
The second phase, envisaging the demolition of the old mar-
ket, was unveiled after Hong Kong’s handover and at a time
when civil society was asserting itself. (20) After 1997, Hong
Kongers began to reappropriate cultural elements from the
colonial period and developed an interest in intangible her-
itage exemplifying their daily life. (21) Artists, architects, and
designers, who were conscious of the architectural signifi-
cance of the old market building, were the first to protest.
After their action, and at a time when redevelopment proj-
ects were proliferating in Wan Chai, local residents began to
mobilise. A coalition urged the government to offer a new
site to the building consortium. Urban planning officials ini-
tially refused to consider any such move, but in 2007 the
government and the URA announced that the building’s fa-
cade would be retained and that part of the old market
would be put to commercial use to accommodate shopkeep-
ers ousted from Wedding Card Street.
The market controversy raised residents’ awareness, and
they began to mobilise against the development model the
government was imposing via the URA, which had unveiled
numerous redevelopment projects in Wan Chai, especially
around Johnston Road. Of course, the area was run down
and located close to business hubs, with attendant economic
pressure to develop and transform it, as well as to raise the
standards of local residents.
Banners on Lee Tung Street
Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/
fa/DSCN1975.JPG 
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Demolit ion  of  “Wedding Card Street”
sens it ises Hong  Kongers
The Lee Tung and McGregor Street redevelopment project
gave a new dimension to civic mobilisation. Lee Tung,
known as “Wedding Card Street,” is part of Hong Kong’s
heritage. For at least four decades, thousands of couples
flocked there to buy wedding and birthday paraphernalia,
calendars, or even visiting cards.
In 2003, the URA announced it would spend HK$3.58 bil-
lion to redevelop this 8,900 square-metre area, the largest
and most expensive project it had ever undertaken. Local
residents and Hong Kongers generally reacted with a mass
mobilisation reminiscent of that following the demolition of
two structures in the Central district – Queen’s Pier and the
Star Ferry Pier. Activists protested the attack on what was
not so much architectural heritage as an intangible heritage
and historic tradition expressed in the form of specific use of
space. Protests multiplied over three years with different
types of actions, including hunger strikes. Once the street
was divested of its shopkeepers, numerous banners went up
offering interesting images to the media and creating quite a
buzz surrounding its history in the years 2006 to 2008.  
From prot ests  to empowerment of  l ocal
res idents
Those in charge of community development (22) in the area
denounced the destruction of old buildings as well as the
community networks linked to them with the disappear-
ance of many public spaces, especially outdoor markets.
Subsequently, they decided to join a project aimed at con-
serving such links. In a four-storey block known as the Blue
House, a symbol of Wan Chai’s heritage, a “community
museum” was opened in January 2007 with a twin objec-
tive: “On the one hand, we aim to preserve and propagate
the cultural essence of Wanchai through exhibitions, cul-
tural tours, workshops and other activities; on the other, we
hope to encourage local participation in deciding the future
of the district and cultivate a sense of belonging and cul-
tural identification.” (23) Exhibitions have periodically been
held, drawing nearly 2,000 visitors a month for various ac-
tivities.
Activities to learn more about the area were organised to
help residents reclaim it. Events displaying originality, such
as “community tourism,” were introduced for residents tra-
ditionally excluded from discussions on urban planning.
Residents acted as guides to help explore Wan Chai.
These were often housewives, who found a means of em-
powerment in such activities. (24)
Such empowerment may be defined as “the process by
which an individual or group acquires the means to
strengthen the ability for emancipation.” (25) These forms of
empowerment are different from the North American or Eu-
ropean experience, because in Hong Kong it is not about
the exhaustion of a Keynesian type of regulation model but
rather reflects the intrinsically asymmetric nature of ex-
changes between the business-friendly government and civil
society. The main argument to justify this process is the rul-
ing coalition’s inability to address the Wan Chai area’s real
problems and issues. Thus the aim is to put new constraints
on the dominant actors so as to question their legitimacy and
thereby take part in strengthening civil society. Beyond the
issues linked to urban redevelopment, such actions aim to
sustain the transition towards an emancipation of the tools
and practices of Hong Kong’s democracy.
Such mobilisation and empowerment by residents was also
carried out within urban planning forums. In November
2008, a group of students and teachers from the department
of urban planning at the University of Hong Kong organised
the “Wan Chai Community Planning Workshop” with a
view to promoting collaborative planning: “Regenerating
Wan Chai through Community Planning.” Of course, the
real impact of such actions is open to question. The vastly
unequal resources of the two sides, and the conflict of forms
and extent of legitimacy highlight the marginal nature of
change.
“Wedding Card  Street”  symbolises  
Hong Kong ’s  loss o f  heri tage
Soon the controversy went beyond Wan Chai and mobilised
a large number of Hong Kongers who deemed it a symbol
of the perverse effects of the development strategy pursued
by the government with the construction industry’s backing.
The media focus on Lee Tung Street inspired a song by Kay
Tse, which met with great success, winning many prizes in
2008 including song of the year. The words and the video
Ar t i c l es
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clip served as a clear indication of Hong Kongers’ attach-
ment to the area and their sadness over the destruction of
material and intangible heritage.
The Lee Tung Street episode touched the hearts of the pub-
lic, who saw in it an attack on their way of life. It added to
the voices raised against the URA’s urban redevelopment
approach. But the criticism was not quite in the NIMBY
(not in my back yard) mould, but rather targeted the process
and content of policy-making. Modernisation at any cost
stood challenged, and other approaches to urban renewal
were proposed:
There is a lack of appreciation by the URA concern-
ing the value of ordinary buildings. A group of ordi-
nary buildings can create an extraordinary urban en-
vironment. This is particularly true when the group of
buildings  also share  common activities. Such urban
environments gradually evolve and become part of
our urban culture. This is the case of Wan Chai Lee
Tung Street, known as “Wedding Card Street,”
Mong Kok Sai Yee Street or “Sneaker Street” and
the “Ladies Street.” For example most of the build-
ings surrounding “Sneaker Street” and “Ladies
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The fir s t  part  of  the  song “Wedding Card Street”  囍帖街 by  Kay  Tse  (謝安琪) :
忘掉種過的花 Forget the flowers that you planted 
重新的出發 Set off with a new start
放棄理想吧 Abandon your dream
別再看 Don’t look at your dust-covered wedding card anymore
塵封的喜帖 As you are moving your house now
你正在要搬家 You have to accept what you have built will be destroyed at last 





就似這一區 Look at this area
曾經稱得上美滿甲天下 It used to be known for its beauty
但霎眼 But all of a sudden
全街的單位 All shops were gone in the street
快要住滿烏鴉 Left are only the crows 
好景不會每日常在 Good life will not last for ever 
天梯不可只往上爬 Heavenly ladder will not go upwards only 
愛的人沒有一生一世嗎 Love cannot live for eternity
大概不需要害怕 So you don’t need to be afraid
(忘掉愛過的他) (Forget the one you loved)
當初的喜帖金箔印著那位他 Whose name is printed in gold on the wedding card
裱起婚紗照那道牆 Forget also the wall you hanged the wedding photo on
及一切美麗舊年華 And all the old beautiful memories 
明日同步拆下 As they’ll be all gone with the demolition 
(忘掉有過的家) (Forget the family you had)
小餐檯梳化雪櫃及兩份紅茶 The little dining table, the couch, the fridge and the two cups of red tea 
溫馨的光景不過借出 The happy moments are merely borrowed
夠期拿回嗎 Isn’t it time to get them back?
等不到下一代 Can we wait until the next generation? 
是嗎 Can we?
• Translated by Suki Chung
Street” are also of no particular heritage value. If
we  adopt the URA’s approach, all these building
have to be demolished and replaced with new one. In
the future, what would be the traces of Hong Kong
ordinary buildings? Should the urban environment of
Hong Kong evolve without respecting and valuing the
unique urban culture as assembled by these ordinary
buildings?
Urban modernisation has always been the main fac-
tor in the demise of our urban culture. It should be
pointed out to the URA and Ms. Tang that redevel-
opment is not the same as modernisation. (26)
The URA’s methods, and the criticism they generated, were
reminiscent of the controversy over former British Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s inner cities policy. The British
government, through the Urban Development Corporation,
gave private promoters the task of revitalising dilapidated
areas but with hardly a word to local residents: “Armed with
decision-making powers and huge funding, the UDC trans-
formed the areas targeted with contrasting results. When the
area concerned held great potential, such as the entirely re-
developed London Dockyard, it was a success for the pro-
moters, who filled it with office blocks and standing resi-
dences. But it was a mixed bag, as it meant the departure of
the poor people who lived there and who had to move with
no benefit.” (27)
Finally, Wan Chai symbolises a challenge, external and from
the ground, of the dominant coalition and its urban develop-
ment model favouring modernisation and competitiveness.
The controversy over the central waterfront exemplified a
different kind of opposition to this model, but it came from
within the coalition itself.
An internal  chall enge  f rom a
section o f the  business
community:  The  Central
Waterf ront  experi ence
Confl ict ing dimensions  of  capi tali sation
and development of  the  waterf ront  
The development of the waterfront has followed Hong
Kong’s historic tradition of reclamation. (28)
The project also exemplifies a recurrent theme in urban plan-
ning. The transition to a post-Fordist economy has led to re-
viewing the use of harbourside areas that had undergone ur-
banisation or major industrialisation. In North America, there
are the examples of Boston or Montreal, in Europe there is
Barcelona or London, and in Asia there is Singapore with its
famous Marina Bay, or even Manila with its current project:
The Central Business Waterfront Park. (29)
With Hong Kong’s transformation into a financial centre, the
development of central areas has been sped up. In 1989, the
government proposed the Central and Wan Chai Reclama-
tion project. Reclamation projects have always attracted
polemics, but in 1996 it became more controversial. The So-
ciety for Protection of the Harbour (SPH), formed a year
earlier, launched the “Save Our Harbour” campaign, collect-
ing 170,000 signatures. The same year, the SPH forced the
government to withdraw its plan to reclaim 190 hectares
around Green Island and to put forward a legislative bill to
protect the harbour. With 95 percent support from Hong
Kongers, (30) the bill was passed into law. It deems the harbour
“a special public asset and a natural heritage of Hong Kong.”
The SPH has played a major role in the mobilisation and
structuring of civil society response to such projects, and it
has attracted support from several other organisations. (31) In
October 2003, the “Citizen Envisioning @ Harbour”
(CE@H) coalition was created to demand greater participa-
tion in decision-making with regard to urban development.
The coalition used the main tools of collaborative approach,
organising exhibitions, roundtables with residents, and pub-
lic demonstrations. A Harbour Business Forum (HBF) was
set up, attracting business people (111 members) to cham-
pion a “dynamic, accessible, and sustainable” vision of the
waterfront.
In response to these actions, the government in 2004 set up
the “Harbourfront Enhancement Committee” (HEC),
inviting representatives from CE@H and HBF. The HEC
helped signal to the government the need for greater open-
ness in the planning process. The novelty lay in the partici-
Reclaimed areas 
Reclaimed sites in grey and those under reclamation in red.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hong_Kong_reclamation.png
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pation of a section of the business community that began to
challenge the pro-growth coalition by promoting a more bal-
anced vision of development. Thus, contrary to the Wan
Chai experience, protests sprang not only from outside but
also from within the ruling coalition’s constituency.
Controversy over  Centra l  Waterf ront
construction fac ing the  IFC
Since 2008, debate has focused on the construction of new
towers facing the IFC complex, (32) which consists of two tow-
ers, the taller one 88 storeys high, and a shopping mall. The
government proposed building a 30-storey block as well as
another of 18 storeys.
IFC representatives denounced the erection of a structure
blocking their view of the harbour and forming a wall around
the promenade. They insisted on the need to review the
project so that the waterfront can be “returned to the peo-
ple.” (33) The IFC asked a group of architects and urban plan-
ners to design an alternative plan offering 9,600 square me-
tres of public space. It included restaurants, cafes, and bars
highlighting plentiful public space linking the waterfront and
the business centre, in particular a large fountain that could
be converted to host group events. 
The IFC representatives sought to stress community engage-
ment:  “We’re doing this for the public benefit.” Like the ac-
tions mounted by CE@H, they used collaborative methods
relying on communication and interaction. In fact, they
noted at the outset that their model stemmed from planners
who had spent the major part of their time talking and inter-
acting: “This talk is a form of practical, communicative ac-
tion.” (34) From this perspective, dialogue and other forms of
communication could influence actors and situations: “Plan-
ners are deeply engaged in a web of communicative and in-
teractive activities that influence public and private actions in
direct and indirect ways .” (35) The IFC lobby held an exhibi-
tion of the competing scenarios of development. Young ac-
tivists explained the various panels and models and asked
visitors to sign a petition, which gained some 22,000 signa-
tures in the first two months of 2009.
Of course, the obstruction of part of the view the IFC com-
mands could slash the tower’s property value. There was
also talk that some owners who controlled parts of the New
Territories did not want to see any new buildings in the city
centre so as to preserve the value of their holdings. While
this stand coincides with that favouring more sustainable and
collaborative planning, it also exposes the hidden face of the
actors (public, private, or community) involved in the com-
plex power relations, who hide behind grand slogans in
order to defend their narrow interests.
In response to the IFC’s stand, the dominant coalition let it
be known, through the government, that the proposed new
buildings would not block IFC’s view, and that after all it
was the march of history, the IFC having itself blocked the
view of several older towers: “The two blocks are much
shorter than the IFC, how can they block views? (…) The
IFC doesn’t allow people to block its view but it itself has
done this for a long time.” (36) Further, the coalition stressed
the need to offer new office space to sustain economic
growth and deal with the current crisis.
Sectional view of tower projects 
in front of the IFC 
Source: Central Waterfront Project 
Management Company Limited
View of projects in front of IFC
Source: Central Waterfront Project Management Company Limited 
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The debate continues, with both sides sticking to their posi-
tions, but as with previous episodes, the government could
be forced to make a concession. It did so in 2008, when the
project size was slashed by 25 percent. Hong Kongers care
about the waterfront, just as they did about Lee Tung Street.
Many argue for an alternative vision of redevelopment:
“The government need to find ways to make our city
self-develop in a sustainable manner, continuous
reclamation and adding buildings here and there is
not the solution. We want a waterfront for all, not for
the developers.” (37)
From chall enges  to  the
dominant coalit ion,  to  a  
new approach to planning?
The experiences with Wan Chai and the Central waterfront
followed similar controversies over the former HMS Tamar
site and the West Kowloon Cultural District, showing that
voices denouncing the two dominant actors in planning have
been rising. But to what extent can the emergence and
strengthening of civil society define this system?
Emerging c ivi l  soci ety 
Since the 1980s, Hong Kong’s civil society has been emerg-
ing and growing in strength. The handover was followed by
the Asian financial crisis and the SARS (Severe Acute Res-
piratory Syndrome) epidemic. The old social contract,
under which Hong Kongers stayed out of political debates
until the economy picked up, was challenged.
In July 2003, the government sought to push through a law
on subversion (envisaged under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s
Basic Law), but civil society (dormant since 1989) burst
forth with a mammoth rally of more than 500,000 people,
who voiced their fears for freedom of the press, of religion,
and of association. The proposed law was dropped after
the loss of majority support from legislators. This led to
top-level departures, including that of Tung Chee-hwa on
10 March 2005, albeit 20 months after the public protest.
His successor, Donald Tsang, signalled a change of atti-
tude. Having served in the colonial regime and as Chief
Secretary, Tsang was the best-placed civil servant to take
over the helm. He enjoyed some popularity among the
city’s residents, who thought he was more capable than
Tung of implementing political reforms and also ensuring
prosperity.
Thus the first post-handover decade saw a strengthening of
civil society: “Following July 1, Hong Kong has seen consec-
utive social movements to demand universal suffrage, defend
its core values, and preserve its natural and historical her-
itage (Victoria Harbour, Star Ferry and Queen’s Pier, to
name the notable themes). These are not sporadic cam-
paigns; they articulate a common desire, particularly
amongst the younger post-1980s generation, to search for
Hong Kong’s identity and worth from colonial past.” (38)
Civil  society :  New acto r in the  coal it ion?
Civil society may have grown in strength and vitality, but it
has not emerged as a full player within the Hong Kong urban
planning regime, and is still dismissed as “vibrant but loosely
organized.” (39) The planning regime remains a partnership in
which the government and the business lobby are complicit
and complement each other. Civil society’s inclusion in this
coalition could upset the very nature of the urban planning
regime, which explains why such an eventuality would be
problematic. A stronger civil society could boost the influence
of pro-democracy parties in the SAR. Moreover, with inter-
ests and values divorced from those of the dominant actors,
civil society could in fact  transform the planning style with a
more collaborative and  community-based approach, and also
a content that pays attention to sustainable development and
no longer orients public policies towards the city’s attractive-
ness and economic competitiveness.
Collaborative  turn  in  the  context  of  an
unf inished  democrat ic trans it ion
The issue of a move towards a collaborative approach has been
subject to theoretical debates of urban planning for two
decades now. (40) Building a consensus through improved inter-
action between different actors could help ameliorate urban
strategies, it is thought: “In the ideal of collaborative planning,
stakeholders representing the differing interests meet for face-
to-face dialogue and collectively work out a strategy to address
a shared problem. Participants work through joint fact finding
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and agree on a problem, mission and actions. The players learn
and co-evolve. Under the right conditions, this dialogue can
produce results that are more than the sum of the parts.” (41)
This vision has gripped Western societies and has emerged
in sharp relief in emerging or newly developed economies (42)
such as Hong Kong, as it highlights the difficulties faced in
effecting such a change as well as the need to achieve dem-
ocratic transition in order to make a success of the process. 
Hooshang Amirahmadi and David Gladstone (43) have come
up with a theory of possible ways in which civil society may
emerge in newly developed countries. They stress three pos-
sible stages:
• The first, strong development with a dominant state and
weak civil society;
• The second, in which civil society asserts itself and con-
fronts the state;
• The third, with two possibilities: development paralysis
through the domination of the state or civil society or more
sustainable development, or a balance between the two.
In this perspective, a further hypothesis may be proffered:
Hong Kong entering a transition period in which civil society
asserts itself but fails to join the urban regime coalition. In ad-
dition to the development debate, Hong Kong’s current situ-
ation also concerns its post-colonial identity: “This postcolo-
nial (re)turn is actually more a recolonization than a decolo-
nization of the capitalist Cantonese city by the mainland
Mandarin master.” (44) The political and institutional situation
has led some researchers, such as Mee Kam Ng, to focus
their work on the possibility of such a development although
political reforms are still under discussion. (45) High-profile ac-
tors and groups such as Christine Loh and her think tank,
Civic Exchange, also acknowledge the need to achieve a
democratic transition in order to secure for civil society a
place in the sun: “Civil society does not only act as a watch-
dog of the government and business, it is also a partner in
governance. The blossoming of civil society in Hong Kong is
ironically a result of an extremely awkward political system,
and most of the time, civil society in Hong Kong is pitched
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against the régime. (…) This will not change unless the dis-
articulated nature of the political system is reformed.” (46)
Expanding the  network  of  actors in  order
to change  urban planning
Such an evolution echoes the very sense of planning, defined as
a “societal process of political coordination among the territory’s
network of actors.” (47) Implementation of urban strategies thus
implies the mobilisation of all public actors – private as well as
civil society – to adopt a common vision articulating their re-
sources and their legitimate interests. Now the success of such
integration lies in the link between the planning process and the
common values identified or acknowledged by different ac-
tors. (48) This raises the question of Hong Kong’s “institutional
strength” and thus of its ability to generate interaction and coor-
dination mechanisms for the actors so as to bring to bear re-
sources and legitimate interests around common objectives. 
This challenge concerns the aims of the collaborative approach,
raising questions especially of the political leadership. (49) West-
ern experiences show that the state often has a key role in the
collaboration process in order to initiate or nurture progress. (50)
The political leadership has to assume the role of a dynamic
agent creating new relationships among various actors. It has to
display “institutional creativity” to fashion (formal or informal)
negotiation forums: more than mere institutional tools, there is
a need to foster a governance culture to end the status quo and
release creative forces of political economic and social actors. (51)
In Hong Kong, the government-business coalition has faced in-
ternal challenges (as over the waterfront) and external ones (in
Wan Chai) that tend to lead to new forms of regulation. These
innovations, however, adhere to the path of dependence. (52)
The local system’s persistence and inertia indicate a robotic
learning process. Thus any expansion of the coalition of actors
and movement towards sustainable urban planning will have dif-
ficulty shaking off the logic of the Hong Kong power structure. 
That Hong Kong is far from the theoretical model of collabora-
tive planning may be linked to the main challenges to this ap-
proach, especially those from the paradigm of communicative
action of Jürgen Habermas. (53) These analyses recommend ob-
serving “the dark side of planning theory” (54) to note the impor-
tance of power relations deliberately neglected in literature
based on communicative rationality.
The role  of  planners in this  transi t ion
I will conclude with a word about the role of planners in this
transition. Planning theories often stress ethical considerations
and the need for urban planners to have a reflexive attitude to-
wards their practices, (55) even being pro-active in favour of so-
cial change. In order to encourage collaboration, in order to
achieve a new balance of power among the state, the business
lobby, and civil society – while the dominant actors command
much bigger resources – they have to support social change
through empowerment of civil society. Patsy Healy stresses
that in the planning process, they should be “involved in the
discussion, design, and management of specific actions, grasp-
ing the fine grain of the interactive dynamics of situational
specifics and broader dynamics.” (56) Such support from plan-
ners should help all actors adopt a collaborative attitude and
overcome opposition, while ensuring that civil society avoids
the easy way out of knee-jerk opposition or resistance. 
Hong Kong planners have been adopting this kind of proac-
tive conduct. This was seen in the case of the “Urban De-
sign Alliance” grouping the Hong Kong Institute of Archi-
tects and the Hong Kong Institute of Planners with the am-
bition to “promote the design and building of a better Hong
Kong.” They stress the need to develop high-density urban
planning, and in the case of the waterfront controversy, sug-
gest solutions that could be a compromise between different
actors now opposing each other. (57)
The expansion of the coalition of actors and the evolution of
urban strategies favouring a more collaborative and sustain-
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able approach involves complex processes, as they imply an
evolution for each actor in the planning system: a public
sphere achieving its democratic transition, a private one be-
coming more ecologically and socially responsible, and bet-
ter organised civil society. The government’s administrative
reorganisation with the creation of a Development Bureau,
and especially the economic crisis of 2008, might have
helped unleash this transformation and the evolution of
strategies towards urban policies. Hong Kong is not the only
Asian metropolis facing difficulties with regard to a change
towards collaborative and sustainable approaches. Singapore
and Taiwan confront the same imperatives, and it is possible
that some time in the future, major mainland Chinese me-
tropolises could also tread this path. •
•Translated by N. Jayaram
109











Hypothesis of a shift to sustainable urban planning, following a rise in the number of actors
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